Abstract: The report discusses the merits of the entitling High Frequency Trading and its rapid growth as the future of computerized trading. A lack of evidence and analysis in the recent literature endows most of the contemporary discussion as only that of an interim typology and in turn grants an element of caution and vigilance in the use of HFT, in the light of the May 6th 2010 flash crash. The effort to introduce controls has been gradually surging in the recent years, through the likes of MiFID I and MiFID II by the European Union. Then, the aim of this paper is to provide an overview of recent research on the effects of HFT on market quality and its robustness. The objective is to evaluate recent literature and assess main theoretical frameworks and empirical findings. Understanding the implications of HFT on market quality could potentially offer a better understanding of cost of capital. Furthermore, the awareness of the changing trading market microstructure opens up new policy options in controlling for market manipulation and aid in sustaining investors’ longterm welfare.
1. Introduction
The advent of algorithmic and high frequency trading (HFT) has become a popular topic over the last decade. The proliferation of digitization in securities market has enabled trade transactions to be settled in the speed of milliseconds. The implication of HFT on market liquidity, short-term volatility and price discovery has caught the attention of many researchers and academics. Yet, the impact of automation and HFTs on market quality still remains controversial. Not only has HFT been associated with increased probability of flash crashes, but also probes some questions about market abuse.
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of recent research on the effects of HFT on market quality and its robustness. The objective is to evaluate recent literature and assess main theoretical frameworks and empirical findings. Understanding the implications of HFT on market quality could potentially offer a better understanding of cost of capital. Furthermore, the awareness of the changing trading market microstructure opens up new policy options in controlling for market manipulation and aid in sustaining investors’ long-term welfare.
1.1 The ambiguity surrounding the High Frequency Trading and the role of latency
Perhaps one of the reason why the impacts of HFT on market quality has not been clear-cut is the fact that (I) the exact definition of high frequency trading has not been constructed yet (according to the US SEC) and (II) the role of latency in the market is faced with ambiguity. First, it is important to make a distinction between algorithmic trading and high frequency trading.
Algorithmic trading (AT) refers the use of computer-based systems to execute trading decisions, usually used by institutional investors, large hedge funds and trading desks. Algorithms serve as a tool for controlling for execution costs by spiting large orders and progressively place them in the market. Submitting large orders all at once may cause negative price impact, thus feeding fractions of orders in a timely manner allows for more effective control of market risk (Kim, 2007).
High frequency trading is associated with algorithmic trading in a sense that it also uses automated system to execute trades. However, common consensus relates HFT to the speed of accessing and analyzing new information and consequently executing trades in high-speed concessions. Unlike algorithmic trading, where the spit orders may be held for longer periods, i.e. days or weeks, HFT closes positions by the end of each trading day (Benos and Sagade, 2012).
As the main distinguishing factor of HFT is speed, also as suggested by the term itself, it is crucial to point out the role of latency in assessing market quality. The fact that different empirical studies use different estimates as a proxy for latency and different measures for HFT activity implies that any inference regarding HFT’s impact on market quality should be taken with a grain of salt. For example, Zhang (2010) in his study of “The Effect of High-Frequency Trading on Stock Volatility and Price Discovery” infers HFT activity based on institutional holdings and turnover over every calendar quarter. Boehmer, Fong and Wu (2012) indirectly estimate HFT activity by calculating the “trading volume to message traffic” ratio.
A vast of research advocates in favor of HFT and its impact on market quality. Most addresses the role of low latency in absolute terms. The idea is that low latency trading benefits the market by (i) reducing intermediation costs, (ii) improving liquidity, and (iii) reduces short-term volatility. However, latency could also be thought of in relative terms, as suggested by Friederich and Payne (2012). In their paper, focusing on the negative externalities of HFT and market abuse, it was suggested that the implication of latency is channeled through the widening discrepancy in latencies experienced by different market participants. Biais and Foulcault (2014) also discuss the impact of HFT in terms of relative latency, i.e. speed differences across market participants, and conclude that as HFT possess speed advantage, this might discourage ‘slow’ traders to participate in the market and increase systemic risk.
2. High Frequency Trading strategies
HFT is not an independent trading strategy, but a different and incredibly faster way of implementing existing strategies. The objective of HFTs is to execute these transactions before anyone else, exploiting greater processing and execution speed to obtain trading profits while holding essentially no asset inventory (Cartea & Penalva, 2011). The main strategies can be divided in three different categories (Chlistalla, 2011):
- Liquidity providing strategies: HFTs replicate the role of traditional market makers, using the same business model, but incurring in lower costs due to automation. Every millisecond, they post several limit orders, providing liquidity and immediacy on both sides of the trading book. In contrast to designated market-maker, however, they do not have any obligation to stand ready to provide liquidity, even in adverse market conditions. In addition, they do not have any restriction in terms of amount of liquidity they can demand through market-orders (Brogaard, et al., 2013). Finally, HFTs tend to assume small inventory risk, as they try to end the trading day with a delta-neutral position.
- Statistical arbitrage strategies: HFTs ensure that the same asset trades for the same price in different venues, by contemporaneously selling the overpriced asset and buying the underpriced one. Alternatively, they exploit discrepancies between derivatives theoretical and market prices, or between an index (through ETF or futures) and its underlying components.
- Liquidity detection strategies: Institutional traders use trading algorithms to minimize the market impact of a large trade. These algorithms typically break the order in small pieces, in order to hide the real size of the transaction. HFTs try to uncover the existence of these large trades by sending lots of small orders waiting to be executed. Once they spot the opportunity, they hit the liquidity ahead of the institutional investors ad drive the price up (momentum – ignition).
Other strategies include: quote – stuffing, i.e. flooding the market with huge numbers of orders and cancellations in rapid succession, in order to cause stale pricing or false mid-prices; layering, which consists in placing a number of sell orders – at several price points – to simulate a strong selling pressure that drives the price down (vice versa for buy orders) (Tse, et al., 2012).
All these strategies have an unclear impact on market quality, in terms of liquidity, information content of trades, price discovery, volatility and robustness.
In the past years, academics have long debated on the pros and cons of this ultra-fast form of trading, and they produced over time a nourished literature on the subject.
3. Evidence for the High Frequency Trading
3.1. Liquidity implications
During the last several years HFT have been gradually replacing human market makers as main source of liquidity, especially in stock markets. At the same time, the bid – ask spread, one common liquidity measure, has been consistently reducing (Figure 1). Of course, correlation does not imply causation, so we need to demonstrate how HFT increased market liquidity.
There are several pieces of evidence that show the increasingly important role of HFTs in providing market liquidity. Using a unique dataset from Nasdaq OMX that distinguished HFT from non-HFT quotes and trades (Brogaard, 2010), the paper shows that HFTs participate in 77% of all trades, demanding liquidity for 50.4% of all trades and supplying liquidity for 51.4% of all trades. Similar results are obtained by (Hendershott & Riordan, 2013), who examine AT and their role in price discovery in the 30 DAX stocks on the Deutsche Boerse in January 2008. The AT liquidity demand represents 52% of the volume; whereas the AT supplies liquidity to 50% of the volume.
(Hendershott, et al., 2011) try to address the problem of causation and correlation by focusing their analysis on the larger category of algorithmic trading (AT), which includes HFT. They argue that if algorithms are cheaper and/or better at supplying liquidity then traditional market makers, then AT may result in more competition in liquidity provision, which, in turn, should lower the cost of trading. However, the effects could go the other way if the algorithms are used to demand liquidity. As a matter of fact, when used by liquidity demanders, algorithms may make them better able to identify and exploited by liquidity providers, which could lead to higher transaction costs.
Since they cannot directly identify the trades generated by algorithms, they use, as a proxy, the number of NYSE electronic message traffic, normalized by the trading volume. If we assume that AT are providing liquidity, the variation of this proxy is essentially due to the submissions or cancellations of limit orders, which should represent the AT activity. The authors used an event study approach, exploiting the introduction of the autoquote [1] in the NYSE market structure as an instrumental variable. They showed that, for the largest capitalized stocks, AT effectively improves liquidity, as bid – ask spreads narrow after the introduction of autoquote. Perhaps this is due to a decline in adverse selection, or a decrease in the amount of price discovery associated with trades.
This result is consistent with (Hasbrouck & Saar, 2013), who link higher low-latency activity on NASDAQ market to lower posted and effective spreads. However, there are not significant effects for small-cap stocks. In addition, this analysis focuses on the AT overall, and it is not possible to isolate the effects produced by HFT.
In addition, one of the clearest evidence of liquidity was noticed by (Menkveld, 2013) in the European market. After studying the presence of HFT in both Euronext and Chi-X market, the paper shows that more than 60% of the market are passive traders (providing liquidity). Moreover, the author also shows that while the Belgian market (without the presence of HFT) still has to wither a high bid-ask spread, the participant of HTF has helped the Dutch market achieve an approximate 50% reduction of the spread.
Most of the research has been in favor of HFT, trying to demonstrate their important role in improving market liquidity. However some other researches did not lead to the same result as they argued that HFT is able to damage market liquidity hence it reduces market robustness. One of the clearest strategies employed by HFT traders is to earn profits by front-running non-HFT activity. HFT funds achieve front-running by analyzing the pending orders of non-HFT funds, identifying their strategies then using these asymmetric information to process trades ahead of those traditional fund. As a result, HFTs are able to either drive the price up or down by buying or selling with their own accounts before filling customers’ order or non-HFTs. This makes non-HFTs incur higher transaction costs; hence, HFTs gain through direct expenses of nonHFT funds. Moreover, (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) shows that this type of strategy pause a large threat of reducing not only liquidity but also price efficiency. By declining non-HFT’s gain, front-running (or anticipatory trading) will then decrease those non-HFTs’ motivation to perform fundamental researches as well, which leads to a reduction in market information production in the long run.
Employing data of return and trade in NYSE and NASDAQ-listed stocks for one year, (Hirschey, 2013) provides further information this problem by analyzing the period of aggressive buying and selling of HFTs. The paper shows evidences supporting the hypothesis that an aggressive trade of HFT will be followed an aggressive trade of non-HFTs on the same stock as well as the rise of this stock price. In addition, the front-running evidence is much stronger when non-HFTs do not properly focused on disguising their orders flow. Although the hypothesis can be caused by other reasons than frontrunning (such as HFTs analyze news faster by using better technology), the remaining tests in the study have helped to slightly remove these doubts. Still, the author believes that there are still limitations in the study and proposes further researches should focus more on this aspect in order to deliver a clearer evidence of front-running.
3.2. Information content and price discovery
Asymmetric information and price discovery have long been of interest of economic models. These models can be easily applied to HFT, because the basic economics of market – making and the effects on markets of differentially informed investors are the same whether the market is automated or manual (Jones, 2013).
Brogaard (2013) analyzes the effects HFTs have on price discovery, using transaction level data from NASDAQ that identifies HFTs. They argue that informed HFTs play a beneficial role in price efficiency by trading in the opposite direction to transitory pricing errors, and in the same direction as future efficient price moves. They create a model in which price movements are decomposed into permanent and temporary components: the former is considered the result of new information and the latter is interpreted as pricing error or noise. This is done through liquidity demanding orders (market orders), which are subject to bid – ask spread and trading fees. The informational advantage, however, is still able to generate trading profits, as it is still higher than the costs. In contrast, their liquidity supplying orders (limit orders) are adversely selected. Nevertheless, their adverse selection costs are lower than the bid – ask profit and liquidity rebates. Overall HFTs have a beneficial effect in the price discovery process because, as a result of their activity, prices have are more informative, and this can lead to a better resource allocation. When trading on superior information, HFTs impose adverse selection costs on other market participants. These costs, however, are balanced by the positive externalities generated by greater price efficiency.
AT monitor markets more efficiently than human traders, and they update their quotes in response to the information they collect. An increase in algorithmic activity causes more changes in the efficient through a quote update rather than via trade (Hendershott, et al., 2011). AT then increases the amount of price discovery that occurs without trades, i.e. just by looking at the different quotes. This informational advantage is even higher for HFTs, as they are able to extract information from observing prices and react in few milliseconds. However, a limitation in both Brogaard (2010) and Hendershott et al. (2011)’s data set is pointed out by Cartea and Penalva (2012), showing that those research was not able to identify the proportion of AT and HF in the activity of the sample firms. Moreover, it is possible that a large proportion of HFT strategies was not listed in the data set as it should be (Cartea and Penalva, 2012, page 35).
In one of the most influential paper on market microstructure, Glosten & Milgrom (1985) argue that one of the reason for the existence of the bid–ask spread is information asymmetries. In their model, market makers compete against each other when transacting with potentially informed traders. Thus market makers face a “lemon” problem (Akerlof, 1970), since a customer agreeing to trade at the specialist’s quotes may be trading because he knows something that the specialist does not. Thus, the specialist must recoup the adverse selection costs suffered in trades with the well informed by gains in trades with liquidity traders. These gains are achieved by setting a spread.
HFTs, however, are not exposed to such informational disadvantage, as they have a superior ability to extract information from the market. As a result, they incur in lower adverse selection costs, and this cost reduction should be reflected in a narrower bid–ask spread (Jones, 2013). In addition, since they replaced human activity with ultra–fast automated processes, they have significantly lower variable costs, than traditional market makers, which can further narrow the spread.
Along with the mentioned benefits, many researchers have analyzed the other side of HFT in producing price efficiency. Since HFT strategies offer a very short holding period, those researchers have been questioning whether the price efficiency caused by HFT is also a short-term phenomenon or it is a long-term effect that can improve market robustness. In theory, (Froot et al. 1992) demonstrates that the short holding period might make HFT trades give more weights in short-term information, which lessen the market efficiency by reducing the incentives to perform fundamental researches. In addition, momentum and positive-feedback strategies, when excessively employed by HFT traders, will make the stocks significantly deviate from its fundamental values. Hence, market will become less and less price efficient in the long run (De Long et al., 1990). In a more recent research, Zhang (2010) also draws a same conclusion when showing HFT is negatively correlated with price efficiency and market ability to reflect information.
4. Evidence against the High Frequency Trading
4.1. Volatility implications
One of the wide spread concerns about HFTs is that their activity could increase short-term volatility, which could ultimately harm non HFTs. For example, in its concept release on equity market structure, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) argued that: “Short-term price volatility may harm individual investors if they are persistently unable to react to changing prices as fast as high frequency traders. […] Excessive short-term volatility may indicate that longterm investors, even when they initially pay a narrow spread, are being harmed by short-term price movements that could be many times the amount of the spread”. (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010).
However, the academic response to this matter is not entirely clear; hence we are not able to provide a unique answer.
Brogaard (2010) uses a unique dataset from Nasdaq OMX that distinguished HFT from non-HFT quotes and trades. He then runs an OLS regression to observe whether there is a relation between HFT and volatility. The results suggest that HFT and volatility are not highly related, especially contemporaneously. Since he can identify high-frequency trades, he compares the price path of stock with and without HFT being part of the data generation process. It also suggests that HFT reduces volatility to a degree. Similar results are obtained by (Hasbrouck & Saar, 2013) who use OLS to show that higher low-latency activity is associated with lower short–term market volatility. Finally, (Hendershott & Riordan, 2013) argue that AT demanding liquidity during times when liquidity is low could result in AT exacerbating volat